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Management and Sale of Foreclosed Properties
F
ORnearly a decade the management of properties acquired by
foreclosure or voluntary transfer of title by deed was one of
the major problems of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. By
June 30, 1937, one' year after the original lending had ceased; the
1-IOLC owned, 'or had effective jurisdiction over, 70,000 properties,
sufficient to provide housing for over a quarter of a million people
(Chart l).1 In the next twelve months, the number grew to about
103,000, remained there until the spring of 1939, and then fell grad-
ually; in June 1942 it had about 38,000 houses on hand, but by
June 30, 1944, the Corporation held less than 6,000.
There was no precedent for a real estate management situation
of this size and complexity. 'Most of the foreclosed properties pre-
sented difficult problems of repair, reconditioning. rental, insurance,
tax payment, and eventual sale. They were widely distributed geo-
graphically, many were twenty years old when acquired, and virtu-
ally all had been neglected by their defaulting owners.2 While many
were classified as in "good" condition, all needed some outlay for
repair and maintenance, and most properties required considerable
expenditure to make them suitable for rent or sale;some presented
problems of obsolescence. Furthermore, just as the HOLC program
of sale was well started, new construction began to increase at costs
which made sale of old houses at. a profit, or even at, a small loss,
1Thefigures in this chapter generally include properties subject to redemption,
although foreclosure action had been advanced on them to the point of judgment or
sale. Such properties were owned, so far as the practical problems of management were
concerned. Excluded, however, arc properties on which foreclosure had been authorized
but to which title (or possession under procedures described in Chapter 6) had not been
taken.
2Fora geographical distribution of all foreclosed properties, see Table 19.
3TheHOLC was free to make outlays for repair and reconditioning of its prop-
erties without Congressional appropriations.
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oftenimpossible when the investment was as heavy as the HOLC's.4
Competition with new housing was further intensified by the fact
that relatively small down. payments and modest monthly instal-
ments made it feasible for people to purchase new dwellings.5
PoLIcIEs AND METHODS OF PROP-
ERTY MANAGEMENT
Each HOLC house was treated, to a considerable extent, as a case in
itself, with special consideration to the property and its immediate
neighborhood. As a general principle, the Corporation avoided quick
sale which would adversely affect the local market, yet the ultimate
objective was sale. (An important decision made early in the HOLC's
planning was to rely heavily upon local real estate brokers for the
supervision, repair, rental, and sale of properties.) A staff to manage
acquired properties was' organized in 1935, and the drafting of plans
for handling properties began well before the original lending had
ceased. The details of the organization and its procedures varied
from time to time and from region to region, but the general fea-
tures may be summarized briefly.
When attempts to forestall the acquisition of a property appeared
to have failed, the HOLC began to plan for its management. A thor-
ough examination of the property and its neighborhood was made,
and an estimate of its probable net rental income (but not the value)
was made by the service representative. A new appraisal was then
made, generally by a fee appraiser. In this instance, in contrast to the
original loan appraisal, the object was to establish a value in line
with the price obtainable in the market under stated conditions of
repair. Special emphasis was placed on net, as contrasted with gross,
rental income; moreover, expected future net rental income was
capitalized to help give an estimate.of value, and care was taken to
4Itis impossible to say how market values at the time of foreclosure compared with
those current when the loan was made. There had been some rise, but in the areas
where foreclosures were numerous the rise had probably not been to the levels of the
original HOLC appraisal. Since the HOLC loans were generous in relation to market
values, and since large interest and tax delinquencies had accumulated by the time of
foreclosure, the HOLC "investment" in its properties undoubtedly tended to be high
relative to current market values.
SUntil1939 loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration, for example,
were being made with longer amortization periods than the HOLC would allow.104 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
get estimates of value both with and without reconditioning plus
the estimated cost of repairs.°
With this information the Analysis Section of the Property Man-
agement Division submitted recommendations to a regional prop-
erty committee—whose members either concurred or stated their
reasons for disagreement—and the recommendation was then re-
ferred to the regional manager. A final decision was usually rendered
a few days after submission of the recommendation.
In anticipation of a .property acquisition an attempt—frequentl.y
successful—was made to obtain the appraisal, with its estimate of
reconditioning costs, and the report of the service representative,
before the HOLC actually obtained jurisdiction over the property.
Consequently,. as soon as it was legally able to act, the HOLC was
prepared to do so. In some cases, however, the HOLC representa-
tives were not able to obtain legal entry before legal acquisition, and
in other cases was abandoned without advance notice to
the HOLC. Also, delay occasionally resulted from difficulties in
evicting the occupant.
INITIAL MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
As soon as possible after a property became vacant, the HOLC had
the utilities disconnected and posted warnings against trespass and
vandalism. Since an HOLC employee could not always be on the
scene, contract brokers were employed to take these initial steps.
Service representatives and brokers were authorized to spend up to
$25 for emergency repairs and servicing; tax records were searched
promptly if a recent report were not available, and any amounts due
were generally paid. Occasionally, an attempt to compromise what
appeared to be excessive tax accruals was made, but this was seldom
successful. The Corporation was somewhat more successful, however,
in obtaining a reduction in tax valuations.7
6Asin the original appraisal, the final result was an average of current market
price, capitalized rentals, and reproduction cost minus depreciation; however, in the
new appraisal greater emphasis was placed on probable future changes in market price
and rental value.
7 Manual of Rules and Regulations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Prop-
erty Management Division (March 27, 1939) Chapter 3, p. 42. "In 1940, HOLC filed
approximately 2,760 special advance applications for reduction in New York City.
The total reduction... was$3,027,675, or over 17%. ..." Assessingfor Taxation in
New York State, Second Report ...ofthe Joint Legislative committee on Assessing
and Reviewing of the State of New York (Albany, January 1942) Legislative Document
(1942) No. 33, pp. 104-105.r
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Except where legal complications stood in the orimmediate
sale was in prospect, properties under the jurisdiction of the Prop-
erty Management Division were offered for rent. In a few cases, the
community vacancy rate was such that properties were held vacant
for a time lest rents be depressed generally.
RENTAL RECORD
In June 1937, the HOLC had more than 30,000 dwelling units
rented.8 The number grew to 77,000 in June of 1939 and then fell
as sales increased (Chart 2). From early 1938 to late 1941, it had, at
all times, at least 5,000 units vacant and for rent. Vacancy rates varied
from around 17 percent in 1936 and early 1937 to somewhat less
than 10 percent from 1940 to 1943 (Chart Average rentals rose
fairly steadily from $21 in July 1936 to $35 monthly in June 1941
(Chart 2).b0 These rentals were on a month-to-month basis in view
of the HOLC's desire to sell, which meant perhaps some lowering
of rental rates.11 On the whole, the rentalmade by an authorized
broker acting for the HOLC and in direct contact with the tenant.
Monthly reports were made by the broker, and he was responsible for
all details of management except payment of taxes and insUrance,
which were handled by the HOLC directly. The broker was respon-
sible for seeing that the property was kept in repair. He was author-
ized to spend up to $25 a month for repairs and supplies without ob-
8 The number of properties was smaller because one out of five properties had
more than one dwelling unit. The figures used in computing vacancy ratios do not
include properties which had not yet been offered for rental.
9 For a time in 1944, the vacancy rate rose sharply. The Office of Price Administra-
tion's regulations made it easier to sell a vacant than a rented property because in
defense areas a buyer was not permitted to evict a tenant unless a down payment of
one-third was made by the prospective buyer.
10Theproperties involved were not, of course, the same from month to month. The
increase was due not only to improving economic conditions but also to the availability
of more attractive properties, greater concentration of properties in areas with rela-
tively high rental levels, and better management methods.
11 The average original loan on properties foreclosed by the HOLC was about
$4,000. Assuming that the loan was 70 percent of the HOLC valuation, the average orig-
inal valuation was about $5,700. Taking the average number of dwelling units (fam-
ilies) per property, 1.3, one gets an average monthly gross income of $32 per property
in mid-1937, $39 in July 1939, and $46 in July 1941. The number of months grossrent
needed to equal the total original valuation would have been 178, 146, and 124, re-
spectively. Aflbutpossibly the last of these figures are much above the capitalization
rates used in the original appraisal. However, the rental used in the original HOLC
valuations was the average of the preceding ten years, not the current or estimated
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CHART 2— NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS RENTED BY THE HOLC,
VACANCY RATIO, AND AVERAGE RENT PER UNIT, END OF
QUARTER, JUNE 30, 1936-JUNE 30, 1948 a
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taming prior HOLC approval, to make emergency outlays on repairs
up to $100, and to purchase fuel and necessary utility and janitorial
services. Replacement of equipment requiring expenditure of more
than $25 had to have HOLC approval.
Some brokers maintained their own organizations for making re-
pairs and reconditioning buildings, and the HOLC permitted such
brokers to make repairs of less than $25 without competitive bids.
The broker, however, received no payment for supervisory services
in such cases; when the cost of repairs or reconditioning exceeded
$25, he was generally required to submit details of the work con-
templated to the regional manager for approval. Competitive bids
were called for if more than $50 were to be spent, but this require-
ment was frequently waived where speed was desired or where there
was slight prospect of getting more than one bidder. The same rule
applied to the purchase of equipment, such as stoves and heating
units; in these cases the HOLC insisted on cash payments to get the
most favorable net price and prohibited the broker's taking any re-
bate, discount, or commission. An attempt was made to have each
property inspected by a service representative at least once a year
to check on the broker's maintenance and the care given to the prop-
erty by the tenant.'2 In all these matters the HOLC was largely free
from the restraints generally associated with government operations;
this flexibility was a condition essential to the effective accomplish-
ment of its task.
RECONDITIONING AND MAINTENANCE
The properties acquired by the HOLC were generally far from new,
and most were in need of repair. Some repairs had to be made at
once, others were postponable, and still others—probably the most
numerous—were actually dispensable. These, if made, would im-
prove the dwelling but would cost more than they would add to the
potential selling price. A major problem, therefore, was how much
should be expended on property repairs and in what ways. On
this question the HOLC stated its policy as follows: "The policy
of the Corporation with respect to the reconditioning of acquired
properties shall be to effect such reconditioning as will place the
property in a condition to invite sale or rental and to compete favor-
12 of Rules and Regulations of the Home Owner? Loan Corporation, Prop-
erty Management Division (October 27. 1937) Chapterp.41.108 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
ably with comparable properties within the immediate neighbor.
hood." 13 Yet the general practice is not easily described. With few
exceptions, emergency repairs were made promptly, and most prop-
erties were refurbished to improve their livability. In some cases,
however, little, if anything, was done; in others there was basic re-
modeling. Large properties were frequently remodeled into smaller
units. In a few areas, where a number of properties were acquired in
a single block—notably in parts of Baltimore and in the Bronx in
New York City—fairly comprehensive repairs and modernization
were undertaken. Other mortgagees sometimes joined the HOLC in
a rehabilitation program; or sometimes they followed the HOLC's
example after its success had become apparent.
Through March 31, 1951, the HOLC spent $89 million on re-
conditioning and repairing its properties and $27 million on mainte-
nance (Table 32). The former was added to capital value, and the lat-
ter was deducted. from rental income as a current operating expense.
These totals amounted to an average of $451 per property for recon-
ditioning and $135 per property for maintenance.14 The outlay on
reconditioning averaged 11 percent of the amount originally loaned
on the properties acquired, probably littl.e if any more than the de-
preciation between the date the loan was made and the date
the property was acquired by the HOLC, and slightly 12 per-
cent of the selling price of the properties (exclusive of selling ex-
penses). As shown in Table 32, the average amount, spent in recon-
ditioning properties was somewhat higher in New York ($699) and
in New Jersey ($742) than for the country as a whole; but since loans
in these states were of larger original amount than the national av-
erage, the reconditioning costs bore about the same relation to the
original amount loaned (12 and 13 percent, respectively), as the av-
erage relation for the country as a whole.
Maintenance expenditures charged to current expense averaged
19 percent of rental income for the country as a whole (Table 32). In
Missouri the rate was 36 percent, in Illinois 30 percent, in Ohio 26
13 ibid. (October 20, 1937) p. 13. Special attention was paid to the elimination of
fire hazards. In some cases the service representative checked on particular items of
equipment or proposed repairs, investigated brokers' vouchers, checked on tenant de-
linquency, and compared charges of different building contractors.
14 Something was spent on almost every property. Painting, repair of walls, floor,
roof;or foundation,and installation of new heating equipment or utilities were com-
mon; rearrangement of rooms or addition of space was attempted infrequently.MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF FORECLOSED PROPERTIES 109
TABLE 32. —RECONDITIONINGAND MAINTENANCE EXPENSE ON ALL PROP-
ERTIES SOLD BY THE HOLC, BY CENSUS REGION AND STATE,






















New England' 15,600 $8.,930 $572 11.7% $3,705 19.0%
Maine 675 193 287 9.6 46 15.6
New Hampshire 422 183 434 13.3 54 15.7
Vermont 392 163 416 12.0 30 12.7
Massadiusetts 10,245 6,143 600 11.8 2,710 19.7
Rhode Island 1,456 663 455 9.5 296 20.0
Connecticut 2,410 1,585 658 12.7 569 16.6
Middle Atlantic 59,576 38,918 653 12.0 14,008 17.3
•New York 34,734 24,287 699 11.8 9,473 18.2
New Jersey 14,108 10,467 742 13.1 3,396 15.6
Pennsylvania 10,734 4,164 388 10.9 1,139 15.9
East North Central43,207 14,070 326 83 3,960 24.9
Ohio 12,548 4,888 390 10.6 1,432 26.4
Indiana 6,688 1,503 225 8.7 368 24.5
Illinois 9,197 3,080 335 6.8 1,013 29.9
Michigan 7,267 2,121 292 7.3 590 22.6
Wisconsin 7,507 2,478 330 7.8 557 18.7
West North Central26,177 7,167 271 10.3 1,916 29.1
Minnesota 2,891 965 334 11.4 151 20.1
Iowa 3,007 719 239 9.7 96 22.7.
Missouri 6,887 2,564 372 10.3 1,314 35.7
North Dakota 1,269 233 184 7.9 25 13.6
South Dakota 1,942 393 202 11.0 67 16.8
Nebraska 4,210 1,109 263 11.8 133 22.9
Kansas 5,971 1,184 198 9.1 160 24.0
SouthAtlantic 12,335 4,901. 398 12.2 948 17.9
Delaware 234 57 244 6.6 5 10.2
•Maryland 3,489 1,799 516 15.2 404 14.4
Dist. of Columbia 239 89 372 5.4 6 9.5
Virginia 2,125 841 396 11.0 191 21.3
West Virginia 779 281 361 11.1 42 17.8
North Carolina 1,643 . 545 332 10.5 85 22.0
South Carolina 646 236 365 13.7 19 14.4
Georgia 1,813 610 336 13.0 137 26.6
Florida 1,367 446 326 11.4 59 26.8





















East South Central 8)333 p3,122 p375 12.9% p534 23.0%
Kentucky 1,549 549 354 10.2 127 24.9
Tennessee 2,275 880 387 13.3 220 22.8
Alabama 3,189 1,211 386 13.3 124 32.6
Mississippi 1,370 482 352 15.4 63 13.6
West South Central18,672 6,111 327 12.2 1,045 17.9
Arkansas 1,715 530 309 14.8 84 16.0
Louisiana 2,393 740 309 9.3 222 18.2
Oklahoma 6,195 2,098 889 12.9 339 17.6
Texas 8,369 2,743 828 12.4 400 18.4
Mountain 5,043 1,531 304 10.9 291 29.2
Montana 343 50 146 5.9 4 11.8
Idaho 432 104 241 11.4 12 27.9
Wyoming 140 18 129 4.9 2 15.4
Colorado 1,289 340 264 10.9 62 16.9
New Mexico 204 40 196 7.1 7 23.1
Arizona 958 389 406 12.2 68 83.3
Utah 1,624 583 359 12.0 137 42.9





























United Statesd 198,200$89,345 $451 11.2%$26,766 19.3%
a Data made available by the HOLC. The number of properties reported as sold is
less than the number of individual parcels of property actually sold by the Corpora-
tion by the number of cases in which the property acquired was divided in some manner
and sold in separate parcels.
U Includes expenses incurred in reconditioning acquired properties for sale or rental.
e Includes expenses of operating properties prior to sale.
d Includes eleven properties sold in Puerto Rico.
percent, in New York 18 percent, and in Pennsylvania 16 percent.
While these differentials cannot be explained fully by the data now
available, they may have been due to. differences in state policy, to
cost differentials, and to differences in vacancy rates and the needfor
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INSURANCE15
When it became apparent that borrowers could not be counted upon
to maintain adequate insurance against losses from fire and other
hazards, and as the HOLC itself became an owner of property, the
Corporation was forced to make provision for the necessary protec-
tion. After seeking terms from several companies, the first insurance•
arrangement—a blanket policy—was made with the Hartford Fire
Insurance Company. With this arrangement, the HOLC automat-
ically purchased a policy and charged the borrower after the latter
had allowed his own policy to lapse; when a new policy was required
on HOLC-owned property, this was written by same company.
In both situations the net cost to the HOLC was below the standard
market rate. (The HOLC was, in fact, performing the functions of
the agent and receiving somewhat less than the equivalent of the
standard agent's commission.) The fact that this arrangement in-
volved some shift of insurance from other companies to Hartford was
far from agreeable to the insurance industry as a whole, and in 1935
a contract was made with the Stock Company Association for renewal
or purchase of policies as required by the HOLC; a similar contract
was made some time later with the Mutual Company Association.
Under these contracts, policies were almost always renewed with the
original company. The HOLC came to feel, however, that it should
insist upon more favorable terms inasmuch as the losses on its prop-
erties were exceptionally low.
On the basis of an HOLC analysis showing that fire losses on its
properties (and also on the properties on which it held mortgages)
were low compared with the premiums being charged, a new contract
was made in May 1940 with the Stock Company Association, the low-
est of twenty-nine bidders. Under the new contract, the Stock Com-
pany Association issued an open policy to the HOLC for each state
(and territory). Properties on'which the insurance had been allowed
to lapse were covered, and new policies were purchased from the
Association, which allocated the business among its members. The
hazards covered varied from state to state, depending upon the
HOLC's analysis of its needs. The borrower was still permitted to
designate a local agent to receive the commission, which was set at
15Thisaccount of insurance experience is based largely upon discussions with HOLC
officials, and on material in various issues of the Eastern Underwriter.112 HISTORYAND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
15 percent, somewhat less than the standard commission, and the
HOLC was to receive 25 percent as payment for its services. New
policies were written for only the amount of the HOLC's mortgage,
the borrower being made responsible for obtaining any additional
coverage.
Several state insurance commissioners declared that the contract
violated the anti-rebate provisions of state law, that the commission
to the agent plus the payment to the HOLC was excessive, and that
state requirements for standard terms were not met. After several
months of discussion, the terms of the contract were revised, reducing
the payment to the HOLC to 18 percent of the premium. Partly to
avoid possible charges of rebating, the new contract specified that the
payment to the FIOLC was for its services in fire prevention and
premium collection.
In June 1940, the HOLC, after analyzing its experience, decided
to carry its own insurance on owned properties, in this respect follow-
ing the established self-insurance policy of the federal government.
Outstanding policies on its properties were canceled, and for several
years insurance was terminated upon the acquisition of a property.
A reserve account was set up to which an amount was credited each
month equal roughly to half the standard insurance premium. Losses
were charged to this account. The HOLC felt justified in following
this policy when it owned a large number of widely dispersed prop-
erties; in 1945, however, when the number of properties held had
declined greatly, it reverted to its original practice of insuring pri-
vately. On the basis of its own accounting, the HOLC's policy of
carrying its insurance risks proved profitable, net costs being consid-
erably less than the standard charge for insurance.'6
The favorable insurance experience was due in good part to the
care that was taken by the HOLC to prevent losses. Working inde-
pendently and with the insurance industry, causes of fires were stud-
ied carefully, and methods of fire prevention were planned and
incorporated into the loan-servicing and property management pro-
grams. As part of their regular routine, and occasionally as part of a
special. campaign, service representatives explained to borrowers how
16Noattempt has been made to compare total HOLC costs with the costs of private
insurance. It is doubtful that UOLC records are available in enough detail to permit
valid comparison when overhead costs, costs of capital funds, time of service representa-
tives and brokers, free postage. and other items not charged directly to insurance are
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fires were most likely to start and how they might be prevented, mak-
ing recommendations for the elimination of specific hazards. Con-
tract management brokers, who were supposed to see that tenants did
not ignore conditions that created fire hazards, made inspection tours,
and corrections were made where necessary. On several occasions,
brochures and publicity material on fire prevention were included
with monthly statements to borrowers.
The adjustment of losses was ordinarily left to the borrower and
the insurance company, although in special cases the HOLC partici-
pated. The HOLC, however, was more active in planning repairs
where there was considerable damage. Representatives of the HOLC
were often able to suggest ways of rebuilding to obtain better value;
additional funds were advanced by the HOLC where it was believed
that this would put the property in correspondingly better condition.
SALE OF PROPERTIES
Although the original discussions of the HOLC gave only incidental
attention to how its operations would eventually be brought to a
close, the HOLC believed and acted as though its eventual destiny
was to be complete liquidation. At a very early date, it was established
that properties would be sold as soon as reasonable terms could be
obtained, that the Corporation would not hold properties for specu-
lative gain, nor dump them on the market. Since the former owner
had generally tried unsuccessfully to sell, even with HOLC aid, it
was reasonable to expect that the Corporation might take a loss if the
property were sold at once. A broad and vigorous sales program might
have depressed real estate values.'7 Furthermore, prices in some areas,
notably around New York City, were low in relation to probable
long-run values, and there was a feeling that the upward movement
of real estate prices which had started before 1936 would continue.
Finally, the HOLC felt that with good management and some recon-
ditioning properties would yield enough rental income to cover their
operating costs. Congressional pressure to hasten liquidation bega'n
to be exerted on the HOLC by 1940, however, with the result that the
HOLC pressed the sale of properties more intensely than it might
have if it had followed its own inclinations.
17Itis impossible, of course, to estimate whether the HOLC had enough houses to
effect the market significantly, but in some communities its holdings undoubtedly were
a significant market element.114 HISTORYAND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
As part, of the appraisal of a foreclosed property, probable selling
prices were indicated, varying with the amount of necessary repairs.
The regional manager would then select, on the recommendation of
the Analysis Section of the Property Management Division, a mini-
mum sales price representing the full current market price (assuming
no forced sale) but without regard to the HOLC's investment in the
property. If the recommended price were $1,000 or less, and if it
represented a loss to the HOLC, or if the price were above $1,000
and represented a loss of less than 35 percent of the HOLC's ledger
value plus accrued and unpaid charges against the property and the
broker's commission, review by a special Regional Property Commit-
tee was required. If the recommended price were over $1,000 and the
loss involved thereby were over 35 percent, the matter was referred to
a Home Office Property Committee.'8
Having set a minimum sales price, the HOLC kept the figure con-
fidential. With few exceptions the figure at which the property was
listed with brokers was higher—often considerably higher—but sel-
dom above the HOLC's investment. The price might be reconsidered
later, if additional reconditioning outlays were made, but an increase
was not mandatory.
In the sale, as in the management, of properties the HOLC relied
chiefly on private real estate firms. Contract sales brokers were ap-
pointed on the same basis as contract management brokers; more
often than not they were the same individual or firm. In addition,
approved sales brokers were appointed; ordinarily, these included
all members in good standing of the local real estate association.
The contract sales broker was required to notify all approved
sales brokers, giving them the descriptive details. The property was
listed for sale with whatever defects of title, liens, easements, or other
exceptions, attached.; The broker was expected to pay for whatever
advertising he desired, though the HOLC conducted special
campaigns in a community it assumed about half of the advertising
expense. Brokers were generally allowed a commission of 5 percent,
the standard prevailing in most communities; in addition, the con-
tract sales broker received a 2 percent overriding commission on sales
made by any approved sales broker acting under his general jurisdic-
18 Manual of Rules and Regulations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Prop-
erty Management Division (August 24, 1939) Chapter 3, p. 5.• MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF FORECLOSED PROPERTIES 115
tion.'9Inasmuch as the HOLC was attempting to get good prices
rather than to offer its properties at distinct bargains, salesmanship
was required, and the standard commission rate of 5 percent was pre-
sumably appropriate to this. Th.e rate may have been somewhat gen-
erous, however, when in major drives, such as that in New York State
in 1944, the HOLC itself helped develop considerable buyer interest
and even made special price concessions.
An occasional sale was made at auction, but, typically, negotia-
tions were with individuals and sales were consummated on a real
estate sales contract basis. Generally, a price would be offered below
the HOLC's minimum, and the broker would so notify the HOLC,
usually making a recommendation which was carefully reviewed.
Eventually, a formal offer would be obtained stating the price, the
cash down payment, and the terms desired. A credit report would be
obtained on prospective purchasers not offering to pay in cash, for the
HOLC placed considerable. emphasis on the moral risk as well as on
the prospective buyer's economic
Generous credit terms were offered to purchasers, a fact which
aided materially in making sales. Since the Federal Housing Admin-
istration system was in operation, new houses could be purchased
with modest down payments, with repayment periods up to twenty
years, and at interest rates that were low by earlier standards. It was
necessary, of course, if properties were to be sold, for the HOLC to
meet the terms being offered by private lenders on the disposal of
foreclosed properties, and in this respect the HOLC was fortunate
that it could act with freedom from statutory limitations.
Regulations of the HOLC required that potential purchasers on
terms try to obtain credit from other lenders, but few purchases were
privately financed inasmuch as private lenders were seldom willing
to assume the risks that the Corporation felt were justified. This
would be expected, of course, since the HOLC had an investment in
the property and did not stand to increase its, risks, whereas the new
lender was free to choose other investment outlets. Moreover, institu-
tional lenders in making new loans were commonly limited by state
laws to terms more conservative than those the HOLC could offer;
Other factors making costs higher for purchasers on terms under non-
19Ibid.(October 27, 1937) p. 21. Exceptions to these rates were made occasionally;
a condition of appointment as a sales broker was that he would accept arbitration of a
dispute over the determination of commission.116 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
HOLC financing were the costs of such financing, including legal
fees, title examinations, surveys, and the like, eliminated in the
I-IOLC sale, and the higher interest rates of other institutional lend-
ers compared with the lower interest rate on HOLC loans (5 percent
to October 1939 and percentthereafter). Sales were made either
under a purchase money mortgage or a sales contract, depending
upon the amount of the down payment and the cost and difficulty of
foreclosure under purchase money mortgages in the particular state
as compared with the cost of mere repossessions under sales contracts.
The minimum acceptable down payment varied with the amount
of the sale, the prevailing community standards, the buyer's credit
rating, the costs of eviction, repossession and foreclosure, and other
factors. A minimum was set that would protect the HOLC against
losses from foreclosure costs, accrued interest and taxes, and from
such other costs as might be incurred during the period needed to
reacquire a property. In general, a cash payment of at least 10 percent
was required, with the balance payable in monthly instalments over
a period not exceeding fifteen years.2° If less than 10 percent were
paid in cash, the subsequent monthly instalments (excluding pay-
ments for taxes and insurance) could not be less than 1 percent of the
balance unpaid when the sale was closed. If 331/3 percent were paid in
cash at the time of purchase, no additional amortization of principal
would be required for five years, but the total had to be retired in
fifteen years. However, only an insignificant number of property sales
were closed under this plan. Whenever credit was extended, the pur-
chaser was required to provide, at the time of sale, for taxes and insur-
ance due in the following twelve months and to establish a tax and
insurance account.2'
The average credit sale involved a cash payment of 13.6 percent
of the total sales price (Table 33). In New York the average was 17.0
percent and in New Jersey 15.6 percent. Since the total for these two
states was so large, it raised the national average. The average for all
other states was 12.2 percent; the average ratio in nearly three-fourths
•20A 10 percent down payment would cover average selling costs (61/2percent)and
roughly four months' rent. If it is assumed that the average gross rentals just covered
the HOLC costs, which was probably not the case in the early years, the four-month
protection was perhaps inadequate, since a somewhat longer period normally passed
between the date of a purchaser's first default and the installation of a tenant.
21Manualof Rules and Regulations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Prop-


















































































TABLE 33 —RATIOOF CASH PAYMENT TO TOTAL SALES PRICE IN ALL
INSTALMENT SALES OF PROPERTIES BY THE HOLC, BY CEN-





















































a Datamade available by the HOLC.
13.6%.118 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
of the states seldom varied more than one percentage point from this
over-all average.
As the HOLC emphasized, these terms were so favorable that a
buyer's monthly payments (including taxes and insurance) were lit-
tle, if any, more than rent for the same property, despite the fact that
the buyer would own the property in fifteen years.22 Even on a more
sophisticated accounting basis—recognizing maintenance costs, obso-
lescence, risk, cost of resale if necessary, loss of income from the cash
down payment, investment and subsequent outlays not required of a
tenant, and, for some, loss of income tax benefits—the balance of
economic factors, quite apart from intangible benefits, probably fa-
vored purchase.
As of March 31, 1951, the total gross sales price of 198,200 proper-
ties was $738 million, an average of $3,722 per property.23 The answer
td the question—How did the HOLC fare on these transactions?—is
very difficult to give, depending upon the accounting methods fol-
lowed and the criteria of accomplishment that are set up. On its own
accounting, as shown in Table 34, the HOLC reported that to the
original amount loaned on the foreclosed properties ($797 million)
was added $63 million in advances for insurance, taxes, maintenance,
foreclosure costs, and miscellaneous costs plus $54 million of interest
converted to principal or accrued but unpaid at the time of property
acquisition. From this total are deducted $31 million of principal
repayments, placing HOLC's investment at time of property acquisi-
tion at $882 million. To this must be added the $152 million of
charges for insurance, taxes, reconditioning, foreclosure costs, and
miscellaneous items made during or after foreclOsure, giving a net
investment (total capitalized value) of $1,026 million after the deduc-
tion of $9 million of receipts from various sources. Deducting com-
missions and selling expenses of $48 million from the total sales
receipts of $738 million gives a loss of $337 million. The figures given
above do not include the cost to the HOLC of the funds invested in
its own properties—approximately $54 million. They do include,
22 The HOLC made special and often successful efforts to get tenants to buy the
houses in which they were living. Sales would be made to former borrowers only if the
price covered all HOLC outlays. Rarely did the HOLC accept other property in ex-
change, and then only property on which it already held a mortgage. Options were
not granted except with the consent of the home office. Separate sale was sometimes
made of personal property.
23 See Table 32, a. .MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF FORECLOSED PROPERTIES 119
TABLE 34 —SUMMARYANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT IN 198,200 PROPERTIES












•ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF LOANS $797,036 $4,021 100.0%
Advances 116,632 588 14.6
Insurance 3,285 17 .4
Taxes 55,918 282 7.0
Maintenance 807 4 .1
Intereste 54,118 273 6.8
Foreclosure costs 2,026 10 .2
Miscellaneous 478 2 .1
Repayment of Principal 31,255 157 3.9
NET AMOUNT LOANED AT TIME
OF PROPERTY ACQUISITION 882,413 4,452 110.7
Capital Charges 152,084 768 19.1
Insurance 187 1 d
Taxes and assessments 34,635 175 4.3
Reconditioning and
capital repairs 89,345 451 11.2
Miscellaneous 2,339 12 .3
Foreclosure costs 25,578 129 3.2
Capital Credits e 8,605 44 1.1
Rents 2,902 15 .4
Collection of deficiencies 2,577 13 .3
Other 3,126 16 .4
NET INVESTMENT IN PROPERTY
AT TIME OF SALE 1,025,892 5,176 128.7
Selling Price 737,756 3,722 92.6
Instalment sales: 688,042 3,730 86.3
Initial payment 93,698 508 11.7
Extended terms 594,344 3,222 74.6
Cash sales 49,714 3,233 6.2
Commissions and Selling Expenses 48,410 244 6.1
CAPITALIZED LOSS 336,546 1,698 42.2
NET OPERATING PROFIT 25,819 130 3.2
NET LOSS ON PROPERTY 310,727 1,568 39.0
aDatamade available by the HOLC.
• b Average amounts per property of instalment sales and cash sales are based on the
number of properties involved in each transaction, 184,475 and 15,379, respectively; all
other averages are based on total number of properties (198,200) originally acquired
through foreclosure.
cIncludesinterest converted to principal($759 thousand) and unpaid interest
accruals at time of foreclosure ($53,359 thousand).
d Less than .05 percent.
e Excludes proceeds from partial sales. Amounts disbursed and received in conneëtion
with partial sales are included in the appropriate accounts.
t Capitalizedvalueof properties at time of sale.120 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
however, an approximately equal $54 million of unpaid interest
earned on loans before foreclosure, which does not represent an
actual cash outlay.
The overhead cost attributable to property management was
probably somewhat greater than would have been the loan service
cost had the properties involved not been acquired and the accounts
continued as loans. It might be fairly assumed that this excess of prop-
erty management cost would be approximately equal to the $26
million excess of property operating income over property operating
cost. The net result of these items would leave the net loss on property
sales at $337 million (plus the cost of its funds invested.in the proper-
ties, if such allowance seems proper).
The average capital loss was computed by the HOLC at $1,698
per property, which was 42 percent of the original amount loaned on
these properties, 38 percent of the total amount loaned when the
property was acquired, and 33 percent of the net investment in the
property at time of sale (Table 35). In New York State the average
loss per property was $3,360 (the reported operating profit of $171
was probably offset by additions to. overhead costs required for prop-
erty management); in New Jersey the loss averaged about $3,000
(Table 35). These two states accounted for a loss of $159 million, 47
percent of the total. Also, loss, as a percentage of the total net invest-
ment at the time of sale, was highest in these two states—42 percent
and 41 percent, respectively. The lowest average loss was in the state
of Washington—$600; 24 loss was not.more than one-fifth of the total
net investment at the time of sale in California, Delaware, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Illinois, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Washington
(Table 35).25
Sales prices obtained by the HOLC amounted to 92 percent of
what was originally loaned on the properties (Table 35) and about
65 percent of their estimated original appraised values. Advances for
24 Yet even total operations in this state resulted in a slight loss rather than profit.
It is of interest that reconditioning expenses relative to original amount loaned were
unusually high in• this state (Table 32).
25 For a sample of loans made on one- to four-family dwellings by thirty-nine Massa-
chusetts mutual savings banks, 1918-31, and subsequently foreclosed, the loss rate was
29.7 petcent of the total amount loaned. HOLC losses in Massachusetts averaged half
of the original loan. Distress loans transferred to the HOLC are not included in this
figure. John Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings and Mortgage Markets














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.124 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
reconditioning, repair, and maintenance were apparently less than
the physical depreciation and the obsolescence that accrued during
the period from loan to sale.26 Assuming that the general level of
real estate prices was at least as .high when properties were sold as
when the loans were made, there are two possible reasons, other than
undermaintenance, for this deficiency: generosity in original ap-
praisal and low sales prices—largely the former. lithe HOLC had
succeeded in selling its properties for the original appraised value,
it would have covered its total costs on these properties (by the
broadest accounting) within a few million dollars, one way or the
other.
It is easily conceivable that the HOLC might have recovered far
more from its properties had it delayed sales; all but a handful of the
properties were sold before boom prices could be obtained—the
majority by mid-1940—and well before personal incomes reached
even half of their World War II peak. This is not to imply that the
HOLC was at fault. The policy it established and followed con-
• sistent with its interpretation of the job it had to do; Congress and the
executive branch were fully informed and Congress pressed neither
for delay innor for higher prices. In fact, it was partly because of
Congressional pressure that sales were pressed. This applied espe-
cially to the selling drives in New. York in 1943 and 1944.27
HOLC loss rates ran much heavier than those of life insurance
companies. For a sample of urban mortgage loans on one- to four-
family dwellings made by twenty-four leading life insurance corn-
panics during the period 1920-46, nearly one out of every twelve
properties securing these loans was acquired through foreclosure.
The net loss after disposal of the property was 9.4 percent of the
26Thetotal outlay for these items was $117 million. Assuming an average period of
six years from loan to sale, the annual rate of expenditures was slightly under 21,4per-
cent of the original amount loaned and 1 7/10 percent of the original valuation. Addi-
tional outlays for maintenance were sometimes made by borrowers. Considering the
types of dwellings involved, the appropriate annual rate of depreciation on total value
would probably range from 3 to percent. On an estimated original appraisal of
$1,125,000,000, the six-year depreciation at 35/4percenta year would have been $253
million, that is, $136 million greater than the HOLC maintenance and other costs; this
amount is about 12 percent of the original appraisal, and about 40 percent of the total
capitalized HOLC loss. The range of possible error in these estimates is wide because
of the uncertainty about the proper rate of depreciation and obsolescence.
27Thelater sales—those made after the wartime rise in incomes was well established
—were mostly in the New York City area where for a considerable period housing condi-
tions remained "easy" relative to most of the rest of the country.MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF FORECLOSED PROPERTIES 125
original loan amount; the net loss on loans in the same sample made
during the years 1920-29 and later foreclosed was .8.7percent.28The
HOLC average loss rate (42 percent) was, more than four times as
large as the life insurance company average loss rate. A comparison
of the regional distribution of HOLC loss experience with that of the
experience of the life insurance companies in this sample reveals,
both regional similarities and differences in loss rates. The HOLC
and life insurance company loss rates were high in the New England
and the Middle Atlantic regions and were low in the East North
Central region (the life insurance companies, in fact, had a slight
gain here) and in the Pacific region. Loss rates for life insurance
companies, however, were very much above the national average in
the South Atlantic and West North Central and West South Central
regions, while the HOLC loss rates were below the national average
in these regions. Since the sample for life insurance companies had
few foreclosures on one- to four-family urban dwellings in each re-
gion (the number of foreclosures ranges from 14 to 148 in contrast
to a range of 5,045 to 59,577 for the HOLC), and since the time
periods covered by the two studies differ considerably (data for life
insurance companies refer to foreclosures on loans made during
1920-29; HOLC data, to foreclosures on loans made in or after 1933),
regional comparisons must be used with great caution.
Though it may not be possible to account for all of the differences
in over-all loss rates between HOLC experience and that of the life
insurance companies, and though it is clearly impossible to measure
the causes of differences, some considerations should be noted. First,
of course, the overwhelming bulk of HOLC loans were made in
distress cases only; they were loans private lenders would not make
or retain. Unless the judgment of private lenders was poor, these
HOLC loans should not be expected to turn out as well as loans
made and retained by the life insurance companies. On the average,
I-IOLC loans were almost 70 percent of an appraised value, which—
at least when the loans were made—was generous. The life insurance
company lOans made on one- to four-family dwellings during the
period 1920-35, however, averaged 53 percent or less of an appraisal
28 R. J. Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1950) Tables 28 and 29,
pp. 92-93.126 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
that was presumably a realistic judgment of the value of the property
when the loan was made.29
Secondly, the HOLC was generally more lenient than the insur-
ance companies in tolerating delinquency before foreclosing. The
study of life insurance company loan experience does not reveal the
number of months loans had been delinquent before they were fore-
closed. A measure which is perhaps even better for our purposes is
available, however; at the time of foreclosure, theinsurance com-
pany investment in the property averaged 7.1 percent more than the
original loan.30 The comparable HOLC figure was 10.7 percent, hail
again as high.
Differences in the time periods covered in the study of HOLC and
life insurance company loan experience must be relevant, but the net
effect is obscure. The geographical distribution of original loans was
perhaps somewhat favorable to the life insurance companies.31 What
is to be attributed to management policies and judgment—and to
chance—cannot be determined. Whatever the reasons, the fact re-
mains that HOLC loss was much worse than that of the
life insurance companies on the most nearly comparable group of
loans for which we have data.
29R.J. Saulnier,cit.) Table B5, p. 134. See also ibid., pp. 94.95; the loss rate on
the disposal of foreclosed properties for a sample of urban mortgage loans made on
one- to four-family dwellings by twenty-four leading life insurance companies, 1920-29,
was highest, on properties with low loan-to-value ratios. The reason for this high rate
is partially due to the fact that many of these twenty-two loans were made on high-
priced single-family dwellings ranging in price from $20,000 to $40,000. The HOLC had
no loans on such properties.
30Ibid.,Table 28, p. 92. Data are based on a sample of urban mortgage loans, subse-
quently foreclosed, made on one- to four-family, dwellings by twenty-four leading life
insurance companies, 1920-46.
31Roughly,20 percent of the sample of urban mortgage loans made on one- to
four-family dwellings by twenty.four leading life insurance companies, 1920-29, were
in the New England and Middle Atlantic regions, where foreclosure rates were highest;
approximately the same number—22 percent—of original HOLC loans were in these
regions. In the Pacific region, where experience was good, the respective figures for
the life insurance companies and for the HOLC were 16 percent and 8 percent. R. J.
Saulnier, op. cit., Table 25, p. 87; Tables 5 and 19 in the present volume.